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Chapter 2 
Party Politics and the Policy Agenda: the Case of the United Kingdom 
 
Peter John 
Shaun Bevan 
Will Jennings 
 
Public policy scholars have not paid very much attention to political parties and 
spatial models of party competition. In the world of agenda setting, bureaucrats and 
elected officials compete with interest groups and experts to try to get their preferred 
topic on the agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2009). Political attention rises and 
falls in response to these demands and according to the cognitive capacity of core 
policy-makers. Authoritative decision-making arenas, such as the legislature and the 
cabinet, provide rules and procedures to ensure that one option is preferred over 
another.  
With such a focus on issues and actors, it is easy to forget that policy-makers are 
very different from each other. Many key participants not only associate with one 
sector of activity or policy, but they seek to appeal to wider concerns and 
constituencies. They may advocate policy positions associated with an ideology—a 
system of ideas or an outlook aiming to change or preserve the world. Linked to the 
promotion of an ideology, politicians have an overriding concern with re-election, 
both to their own districts, but also—in a parliamentary system—as possible 
members of a government. Party organizations generally seek to gain power and to 
implement their own program of policies when in government. Their leaders occupy 
the highest office and have places at the cabinet table. They can make an array of 
appointments across public organizations, and the state’s bureaucrats have to do 
their bidding. They use this power to influence policies in a particular direction and 
to impose some degree of coherence. 
Rather than being analyzed in its own right, party color appears only as a 
control variable in many studies of the policy agenda. But it is reasonable to expect 
left parties to concentrate on social policy, and for right parties to focus on 
international affairs and defense, the so-called guns and butter trade-off. The 
strength of parties in legislatures should, moreover, determine the degree to which it 
is possible for them to focus on their owned issues. The UK should be a strong case 
of party dominance because of the way in which centralized and disciplined parties 
command a majority of seats in the legislature controlling both policy-making and 
implementation (Norton 2005). An interesting starting point for the study of policy 
agendas of political parties is to find out whether the party dominance in the UK case 
translates into distinctive policy outputs.  
To assess the importance of political parties for the policy agenda, we use data 
on executive and legislative agendas in the UK between 1946 and 2008, coded 
according to the policy content system of the UK Policy Agendas Project (consistent 
with the coding system for the Comparative Agendas Project). The objective is to 
analyze the impact of changes of the party in government on issue content. We first 
consider the policy content of the Speech from the Throne and Acts of UK 
Parliament, examining the impact of party control on annual executive and 
legislative priorities of British government. We are interested in the direction and 
size of the effects of the partisan control of government for attention to issues such as 
health, education and defense. We conclude by discussing the extent of the impact of 
parties on the policy agenda in UK politics and the implications of these findings for 
the comparative study of policy agendas. 
 
Parties and Policy Agendas 
The central proposition of the literature is that political parties pursue distinctive 
policy agendas. Parties compete on the issue agenda, seeking to establish or maintain 
a reputation for competence, taking ownership, on some issues more than others 
(Budge and Farlie 1983; Carmines and Stimson 1993; Petrocik 1996). Further, parties 
differentiate their policy positions to provide responsible representation of their 
supporters, sometimes even at the expense of strategic considerations (see Adams 
2001). This is partly because they respond to different preferences in the electorate, 
such as between left and right positions; but also because they are backed by activists 
and interest groups that articulate an ideology, which they seek to put into practice. 
It is likely that they will prioritize policy issues that link to their underlying 
preferences. In addition, the public expects parties to represent a diversity of 
preferences from which they can choose (Ezrow 2007). This expectation plays into the 
concerns of the activists, but of course too much distinctiveness could precipitate the 
rejection of the party by the voters at the ballot box. Giving priority to an issue 
suggests that governments will pursue more policy on that issue, while giving the 
minimum necessary attention to other issues that it does not claim ownership.  
The comparative politics literature highlights the impact of parties. Output 
studies show that parties of the left tend to favor higher expenditure on social items 
(e.g. Castles 1982). The literature in comparative political economy stresses that left 
parties can maintain this expenditure even in the context of a globalized international 
economy (Garrett 1998; Swank 2002). Parties prioritize different aspects of policy, 
such as left parties preferring less unemployment and right parties less inflation 
(Hibbs 1977). Evidence from the literature on policy and public opinion is that parties 
seek to balance defense and welfare expenditure with left parties preferring more 
social welfare and right parties preferring more defense (see Soroka and Wlezien 
2009). The party positions literature shows that parties receive a mandate from 
elections, which they translate into policy promises and outputs (McDonald and 
Budge 2005).  
Nonetheless, there are factors that reduce the influence of political parties on 
public policy: the electoral competition for the median voter, responsiveness to 
public opinion, the influence of interest groups and media pressures. Moreover, there 
is pressure for policy stability when a party enters government (Rose and Davies 
1994). Typically its elite becomes more separated from the party membership, 
charged as they are with governing the country, and where they do business with 
non-partisan individuals and groups, such as bureaucrats and experts. Party effects 
are not expected to be strong across all areas, especially where policy-making relates 
to valence issues (Stokes 1963), on which there is broad consensus over objectives. To 
obtain maximum advantage from ‘selective emphasis’ or issue ownership (Budge 
and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996), parties need to emphasize those issues that benefit 
them, and respond to the concerns of their activists, but not depart too far from 
prioritizing policies that are important for the country and maintaining a reputation 
for competence and good governance. Moreover, comparative analysis assumes that 
political parties pursue multiple objectives as vote seekers, office seekers and policy-
seekers (Strøm and Muller 1999). The balancing of these objectives takes place within 
particular national institutional structures that mediates these party effects (Schmidt 
1996). It is to the very particular institutional context of the UK that we now turn. 
 
The UK case 
The UK is a party dominated political system. Rose sums up the conventional 
wisdom: ‘party, not Parliament, determines control of British government.’ (1983, 
282). The first-past-the-post (single-member plurality) electoral system usually 
creates a majority of seats for one party after a general election. With a secure 
majority—and a centralized party with good discipline over its members in 
Parliament—the government has a near monopoly over policy-making for an 
electoral term of up to five years because there are no veto players in the second 
unelected chamber or at the regional level. The electoral system also benefits one 
main opposition party and penalizes challengers. With the party in opposition 
preparing to take on this governing role should the incumbent lose the next election, 
this strong form of party government is sustained over time. 
The traditional framework of British politics has become more complex in 
recent years, which might appear to reduce the autonomy of the executive and the 
party in government. These changes include increasing numbers of rebellions by 
MPs against their party whips (Cowley 2005); the growing assertiveness of members 
of the House of Lords (Russell and Scaria 2007); greater regional autonomy from the 
devolution of power to governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; the 
ceding of decision-making to the European Union since the mid-1980s; and the 
growing power of the higher courts since the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
reinforced by the creation of the Supreme Court in 2009. Moreover, the first-past-the-
post system no longer so clearly facilitates the electoral dominance of single party 
majority government with a less clear relationship between votes and seats (Curtice 
2010). There is also greater electoral support for parties outside the duopoly of 
Labour and the Conservatives, in particular at the subnational level, where 
proportional representation systems are in operation. Nonetheless, the two main 
parties survive as the key electoral machines for national and local level elections; 
they win the most seats; and usually obtain a working majority in the House of 
Commons. The governing party is able to enact most of its program through 
parliament (Bevan et al. 2011) and implement its manifesto pledges (Hofferbert et al 
1995; Bara 2005), having access to ministerial and prerogative powers like their 
predecessors. Nor does party control of policy alter much when a coalition is elected 
into office as happened in May 2010, when the Conservative Party and Liberal 
Democrats formed a new government. In a coalition, the leading parties allocate the 
portfolios between them, agree a joint policy agenda reconciling their election 
platforms and then control the policy process to implement that agenda. A coalition 
government therefore implements the parties’ manifestos, if in moderated form. 
Nevertheless, it is to be expected that if coalitions become the norm in British politics, 
parties will trade in their policy preferences on some issues in return for securing 
ministerial portfolios or policy concessions on other issues. This can weaken the 
relationship between one party’s ideology and the priorities of the policy agenda it 
pursues when a member of a government (Müller and Strøm 2000). 
Moreover, even if the UK is a perfect example of a party-dominated system, we 
need not always expect partisan-influenced policy outputs, as there are constraints 
that prevent parties from pursuing their preferences. Parties can be sensitive to the 
size of their majority in parliament, either enabling radical programs or forcing 
governments to steer towards the center and risk succumbing to paralysis. Some 
studies suggest that these pressures are so strong that party control does not make a 
difference to policy outputs in the UK (Rose 1980, Rose and Davies 1993). It may be 
the case that the very dominance of parties in the UK system means they are subject 
to more pressures than in a multi-party system. Factors that push them together are 
party competition, media pressure, the need to be credible as a governing party, 
powerful producer groups and the influence of a centralized bureaucracy. The 
movement of parties away from their ideological base is a feature of the history of 
British politics, such as the Labour Party’s move to the center in 1990s under a 
reformist leadership and modernizing agenda. Party leaders created a rhetorical 
commitment of deference to markets and adaption to a globalized economy to justify 
a shift of policy toward the center (Hindmoor 2004). 
In spite of these pressures, we still expect parties in the UK to seek to establish 
or maintain ownership of certain parts of the policy agenda, paying more attention to 
issues that benefit them and paying less to those that do not. However, there may be 
issues that parties attend to because they are important and in the national interest or 
because there is no partisan interest or advantage, perhaps because of the technical 
and non-public nature of decision-making in a particular domain. We do not expect 
party control to impact attention across all parts of the policy agenda. 
 
Data and methods 
To analyze the impact of party control of government on the policy content of 
executive and legislative agendas in the UK, we use data from the UK Policy 
Agendas Project (www.policyagendas.org.uk) for the period from 1946 to 2008 and 
for nineteen major topic codes that encompass the domains of public policy that UK 
government deals with (see Appendix 1).1 The analyses therefore cover the period of 
policy-making since the Second World War, during which time the party system was 
                                                 1 The UK major topics deviate only slightly from the US ones. Colonial and Territorial issues 
have been added to topic 21 and immigration has been moved from major topic 5 to major topic 
2.  
relatively stable yielding extended periods of control by the right Conservative party, 
and the left Labour party. 
The chapter uses two measures of the policy agenda of UK government that 
reflect different stages of the policy process and which the governing party has 
extensive control over. The first is the Speech from the Throne—also known as the 
Gracious Speech and the King’s or the Queen’s Speech—which is an integral feature 
of the State Opening of Parliament when the sovereign addresses the chamber of the 
House of Lords with members of the House of Commons watching from the 
galleries. Since 1901, the Speech from the Throne has been a permanent fixture of the 
political calendar in Westminster, occurring at the start of the parliamentary session.2 
The speech highlights matters of importance to the government and details the 
legislative program that government intends to enact in the forthcoming year. By 
highlighting certain issues and ignoring others, this provides an annual platform for 
government to shape the national agenda (Jennings et al. 2011).  
The unification of executive and legislative powers in the British political 
system, combined with its longstanding tradition of party discipline suggests that 
there should be a close link between executive and legislative agendas and the other 
outputs of government. Empirical evidence shows a strong relationship between 
                                                 
2. Until 1928, the start of a new parliamentary session generally occurred early in the year, January or 
February. Since then, the parliamentary year has begun in October or November except after an 
election, where the first act of business for an incoming government is the opening of parliament with 
a Speech from the Throne.  
manifesto pledges, legislative proposals of governing parties and actual policy 
outputs (Hofferbert and Budge 1992; Bara 2005; Bevan et al. 2011). The speech has 
been used as a measure of policy-making (e.g. Namenwirth and Weber 1987; Bara 
2005; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005; Jennings and John 2009; Jennings et al. 2011; 
John and Jennings 2010), as well as in comparison with similar annual executive 
speeches delivered by the head of state or head of government in a number of 
countries across Western Europe and in the U.S. (e.g. Breeman et al. 2009; Jennings et 
al. 2011; Mortensen et al. 2011). This statement of the government’s agenda is a key 
part of the agenda-setting process in British politics. Analysis of its policy content 
provides a means for assessing the institutional function of the speech as a signal of 
executive priorities and legislative proposals.  
The second institutional venue is Acts of UK Parliament. An Act of Parliament 
is the name for primary legislation enacted by the UK Parliament. These come into 
effect after royal assent. The passage of legislation is dependent upon first, second 
and third readings of the bill. Most bills that are introduced into parliament by the 
government are passed (there is no vote on the first reading, and votes on the second 
and third reading are—typically—on party lines, although with exceptions). In 
practice, the third vote is the only vote that counts as first and second readings and 
committee stages are procedural. The number of bills that are rejected by the House 
of Commons is low. The 1911 and 1949 Parliament Acts enable the House of 
Commons to override votes of the House of Lords in the next legislative session (so 
the Lords act as a weak check on the lower house).  
The full transcripts of the Speech from the Throne were blind coded by two 
researchers first to break them into ‘quasi-sentences’ (Volkens 2002), demarcated by a 
policy idea or statement as well as punctuation, and to determine whether each 
quasi-sentence contained any policy content. The quasi-sentences were then assigned 
a major topic code and sub-topic code. This procedure led to 90 per cent inter-coder 
agreement for most years. The coders resolved remaining differences through 
discussion and the project leaders made the final decision in the few cases where 
coders could not agree (see Jennings et al 2011). 
The short and long titles of Acts of the UK Parliament were blind-coded by 
two researchers; assigning a major topic code and subtopic code to each Act. This 
procedure led to eighty-five percent inter-coder reliability at the major topic level. 
The remaining differences were resolved through discussion by the project leaders. 
For each act the date of royal assent of Acts of the UK is the observed time point, and 
since all acts receive assent prior to the start of a new parliamentary session, which is 
marked by the Speech from the Throne, we are certain that all Acts are properly 
attributed to the correct parliamentary year and, subsequently, the correct Speech 
from the Throne. 
To test the effect of party control of government on the content of each of these 
policy agendas, we estimate a time series regression for each of the nineteen policy 
topics, for the period from 1946 to 2008, with speeches or laws as the dependent 
variable. In this ‘autoregressive distributed lag’ (ADL) model the lagged value of the 
dependent variable controls for the autoregressive nature of the agenda over time. 
We test for the effect of party control with a variable that is coded 1 when there is a 
Conservative government and 0 when there is a Labour government. We also include 
a variable to control for the short session of parliament in 1948, which concerned 
passage of the third Parliament Act to resolve the gridlock between the House of 
Lords and the House of Commons. In addition, we control for the effect of time to 
capture long-run changes (i.e. trends) in attention to large issues in our dataset, in 
particular the decline of agriculture, defense and international affairs as core topics 
for the executive. 
 
Analysis 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 report the frequencies of issue attention for speeches and acts by 
issue. These figures allow us to observe attention to each issue on the agenda and 
when it changes. The unit of analysis here is the quasi-sentence for speeches and the 
long-title of the legislation for acts. The vertical lines indicate changes in party 
control of government, of which there are just six during this period, because of 
several extended periods in office by a single party (the Conservative Party from 
1951 to 1964 and 1979 to 1992 and Labour from 1997 to 2010). As in previous studies 
(John and Jennings 2010; Jennings et al. 2011), we observe that the length of the 
speech remains relatively constant after rising just after the Second World War. The 
number of acts has declined since the mid 1970s (also see John et al. 2013). Figures 2.1 
and 2.2 do not appear to indicate large changes at the point when a new party enters 
office with no dramatic shifts in attention to certain issues following party 
transitions. These observations suggest that following a transition in party control the 
basic structure of the policy agenda remains stable, responding to long-run forces, 
such as the gradual weakening of the impact of the economy and foreign affairs on 
the agenda, the decline of older policy concerns and the rise of new issues (see John 
and Jennings 2010). The growth in attention to social policies, such as education and 
health, appears to be a feature of Labour governments after 1997 as represented in 
speeches.  
 
  
Figure 2.1. Speeches from the Throne, 1946-2008 
 
Note: The vertical dashed lines indicate changes in party control of Parliament. 
Figure 2.2. Acts of Parliament, 1946-2008 
 
Note: The vertical dashed lines indicate changes in party control of Parliament 
The use of time series regression analysis enables us to analyze the impact of 
parties on the issue content of the policy agenda, which tests for party influence 
while controlling for other factors. The results of these analyses are presented in 
Table 2.2 for speeches and Table 2.3 for laws. For speeches, six out of nineteen topics 
show the effect of parties to be statistically significant (one topic is significant at the 
90% confidence level, the rest at the 95% level). Overall, the effect size ranges from .8 
(for banking and domestic commerce) to 2.6 quasi-sentences (for government 
operations). The direction of effect indicates that the Conservative party attends more 
to international affairs, while Labour tends to emphasize health, law, crime and 
family issues, social welfare, banking and domestic commerce and government 
operations. In general, the findings for the speeches are consistent with the issue 
ownership model and traditional party images/reputations—the Conservative Party 
emphasizes foreign affairs whereas Labour focuses on social issues, which confirms 
findings from earlier research on the effect of public opinion on the Queen’s Speech 
for the period from 1960 to 2001 (Jennings and John 2010: 848), and is consistent with 
conventional wisdom. The valence issue of the economy shows no party difference as 
expected. 
 
  
Table 2.1. UK Policy Agendas Project major topic codes   1. Macroeconomics 2. Civil Rights, Minority Issues, Immigration, and Civil Liberties 3. Health  4. Agriculture  5. Labour and Employment 6. Education and Culture 7. Environment  8. Energy  10. Transportation  12. Law, Crime, and Family Issues 13. Social Welfare  14. Community Development, Planning and Housing Issues 15. Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce 16. Defence  17. Space, Science, Technology and Communications 18. Foreign Trade 19. International Affairs and Foreign Aid 20. Government Operations 21. Public Lands, Water Management, Colonial and Territorial Issues  See www.policyagendas.org.uk for the full codebook with sub-topic categories and topic descriptions.    
Table 2.2: The Speech from the Throne, Dynamic and Party Effects, 1946-2008, by Major Topic 
  1, Economy 2, Civil 3, Health 4, Agri 5, Labour 6, Educ 7, Envi 8, Energy 10, Trans 12, Law L.Speech 0.521*** 0.011 -0.010 0.119 0.380** 0.263* 0.007 0.217† 0.214 0.112  (0.110) (0.129) (0.124) (0.124) (0.117) (0.128) (0.134) (0.129) (0.131) (0.141) Time -0.024 0.045** 0.042*** -0.055*** -0.012 0.024 0.033*** -0.003 0.002 0.109***  (0.022) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.028) Conservative -0.591 -1.457 -1.408*** 0.372 -0.503 -0.220 -0.206 -0.426 -0.428 -1.494*  (0.780) (0.556) (0.336) (0.351) (0.429) (0.593) (0.272) (0.372) (0.471) (0.709) Short -10.871*** -1.380 -1.274 -3.646** -3.063† -1.785 -0.275 -1.865 -1.980 -2.330  (3.168) (2.157) (1.236) (1.350) (1.702) (2.377) (1.089) (1.507) (1.876) (2.715) Constant 5.577** -0.427 -0.401 5.491*** 2.792** 0.839 -1.053† 1.354 1.908† -2.363  (1.8330 (1.192) (0.679) (0.986) (0.982) (1.302) (0.618) (0.819) (1.060) (1.600) Adj. R2 0.294 0.216 0.455 0.438 0.151 0.102 0.235 0.007 0.032 0.481  13, Social 14, House 15, Commer 16, Defence 17, Science 18, Trade 19, Inter 20, Gov’t 21, Lands  L.Speech 0.221† 0.137 0.156 0.285* 0.361** 0.422*** 0.218† 0.263* 0.352**   (0.127) (0.135) (0.128) (0.123) (0.126) (0.116) (0.127) (0.122) (0.116)  Time 0.001 -0.034* 0.006 -0.027 0.001 -0.039** 0.117** 0.047* -0.048*   (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.006) (0.014) (0.042) (0.022) (0.019)  Conservative -1.202* -0.647 -0.830† 1.092 0.158 -0.023 2.660* -2.257** 1.138   (0.503) (0.526) (0.493) (0.687) (0.210) (0.456) (1.322) (0.787) (0.706)  Short -3.048 -3.697† -2.080 -5.332* -0.546 -5.238** -9.186† -4.448 -7.572**   (1.878) (2.111) (1.960) (2.629) (0.829) (1.812) (4.921) (2.938) (2.685)  Constant 2.331* 4.930*** 1.855† 5.268** 0.125 4.258*** 3.215 2.257 7.719***   (1.071) (1.379) (1.089) (1.634) (0.452) (1.223) (2.703) (1.630) (1.828)  Adj. R2 0.159 0.104 0.049 0.217 0.100 0.351 0.371 0.357 0.375  Note: N=62, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, † p ≤ 0.10 
The exception to the issue ownership model is crime, which is commonly 
viewed as a Conservative-owned issue, but here the effect is negative and significant 
indicating that it received more attention from Labour governments. The reverse 
argument is that a government might want to be seen to be attending to issues where 
it does not have issue ownership to reassure the public, which has been called ‘issue 
trespass’ (Norporth and Buchanan 1992; also see Damore 2004). An alternative 
explanation is that it was New Labour, under the leadership of Tony Blair, which 
focused on crime, both as a means of undermining the Conservative government (see 
Farrall and Jennings 2011), but also to signal that Labour had become moderate after 
its shift to the left during the early 1980s. Before becoming leader of the Labour Party, 
Blair was opposition spokesman on home affairs and famously used the slogan, 
‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’, which subsequently appeared in the 
1997 manifesto, and became a symbol for a more populist Labour Party. If the 
regression is re-estimated including a variable controlling for the period after 1997, 
this variable has a significant effect on attention to the issue of crime and renders the 
party effect statistically insignificant. 
 
  
 Table 2.3: Acts of Parliament, Dynamic and Party Effects, 1946-2008, by Major Topic 
  1, Economy 2, Civil 3, Health 4, Agri 5, Labour 6, Educ 7, Envi 8, Energy 10, Trans 12, Law L.Acts 0.347** 0.001 -0.153 -0.186 -0.060 -0.190 -0.123 -0.230† 0.100 0.031  (0.121) (0.143) (0.129) (0.123) (0.134) (0.127) (0.133) (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) Time -0.005 0.013 0.010 -0.092*** -0.017 -0.014 0.005 -0.015† -0.032 -0.009  (0.022) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.021) (0.030) Conservative -0.169 -0.344 0.418 0.480 -0.153 0.195 0.360 0.718* 1.330† 1.935†  (0.781) (0.297) (0.375) (0.486) (0.410) (0.373) (0.442) (0.303) (0.749) (1.089) Short -6.537* -0.996 -2.260 -4.881* -2.310 -2.224 -1.548 -1.723 -4.496 -7.839†  (3.070) (1.106) (1.486) (1.937) (1.673) (1.489) (1.738) (1.162) (2.947) (4.328) Constant 5.359** 0.487 2.018* 9.877*** 3.288*** 2.963*** 1.363 2.775 5.376 8.004**  (1.797) (0.612) (0.840) (1.380) (0.963) (0.866) (0.957) (0.678) (1.770) (2.558) Adj. R2 0.150 0.037 0.031 0.397 -0.004 0.024 -0.028 0.135 0.102 0.064  13, Social 14, House 15, Commer 16, Defence 17, Science 18, Trade 19, Inter 20, Gov’t 21, Lands  L.Acts -0.057 0.045 -0.065 0.041 -0.096 0.127 -0.282* -0.470*** 0.081   (0.133) (0.128) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127) (0.126) (0.127) (0.106) (0.128)  Time 0.013 -0.037* -0.004 -0.067*** -0.022** -0.025*** 0.006 -0.159*** -0.078**   (0.011) (0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.023) (0.024)  Conservative 0.139 0.642 1.756* -0.483 0.157 -0.351 -0.582 -1.714* 0.573   (0.394) (0.610) (0.746) (0.506) (0.282) (0.244) (0.381) (0.744) (0.784)  Short -1.315 -4.006 -3.940 -4.368* -1.717 -1.743† -2.479 -9.293** -5.987†   (1.559) (2.463) (2.948) (2.010) (1.124) (0.957) (1.499) (2.955) (3.140)  Constant 0.837 5.455*** 4.289* 6.803*** 2.781*** 2.621*** 2.513** 21.759*** 8.476***   (0.858) (1.524) (1.699) (1.403) (0.667) (0.622) (0.856) (2.181) (1.997)  Adj. R2 -0.020 0.085 0.072 0.262 0.084 0.212 0.071 0.461 0.193  Note: N=62, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, † p ≤ 0.1 
  
We would expect a similar pattern of issue emphasis for Acts of UK Parliament 
because even though speeches and acts are distinct venues for decision-making, they 
are closely related parts of the policy process. This is because governments use the 
speech to set the legislative agenda for the following year (see Bevan et al. 2011). 
However, acts are different: they are less designed for public consumption and 
agenda-setting and are sometimes passed because of necessity to respond to external 
factors or arise because of internal bureaucratic demands, which might be less 
popular. The results reported in Table 2.3 indicate the impact of party control of 
government on acts for each policy topic, and show that parties are again important, 
being statistically significant in five out of the nineteen topics (two of which are 
significant at the 90% level). The Conservative Party tends to pass more legislative 
outputs on energy, crime, transport and banking and domestic commerce, while 
Labour prefers to legislate more on government operations. The effect sizes for the 
significant coefficients range from .7 (for energy) of an act to nearly 2 for acts (for law 
and crime). For legislative outputs, then, there is little evidence in support of the 
issue ownership model as it is not clear that either of the parties emphasize these 
particular topics, nor is there a difference in legislative attention to the core social 
policy sectors such as education and health or to defense and foreign affairs. This is 
surprising given the party differences found in the issue content of the speech, and in 
light of the evidence of a substantial rate of transmission from the speech to acts. 
There is no difference between the parties in attention to the economy as expected. 
The results also indicate that there is a sign reversal between the two venues for the 
issues of crime and banking and domestic commerce, with the Conservative Party 
legislating more on these issues, but talking less about them. We would not expect a 
large party difference in legislation concerning international relations because most 
government action in this policy domain is conducted through executive decisions 
rather than legislation, with the exception of international treaties that require House 
of Commons approval. 
 
Conclusion 
Parties matter in British politics, but there may be good reason to think that parties 
do not matter for the policy agenda as much as classic accounts of party government 
would lead us to believe. Only about a third of the issue domains identified by the 
Policy Agendas Project coding system are significantly different under Labour than 
under the Conservatives, both for the Speech from the Throne and for Acts of UK 
Parliament. For the remainder of the topics, other factors, such as public opinion, 
events, external changes and the work of pressure groups, make their impact on 
public policy, consistent with the metaphor of issue intrusion where new issues are 
able to access the governing agenda irrespective of the partisan cycle (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). Here the dynamics of political attention also make their impact 
where issues rise up the policy agenda beyond the control of party leaders. More 
fine-grained analysis using variables that attend to each policy sector, perhaps using 
case study methods, could show how issue attention adjusts in response to 
emergence of these problems. Moreover, earlier work on the issue diversity of the 
policy agenda shows that party control of government is not a significant factor in 
determining the overall structure or focus of the policy agenda (John and Jennings 
2010).  
Party change through elections result in an inflow of new decision-makers and 
new ideas inside government, but there are also pressures to retain a stable level of 
attention to policy issues once competition for space and time on the parliamentary 
timetable comes into focus. Parties also compete to ensure that the issues that are on 
the public’s mind are on their agenda too, making the electoral changing of the guard 
less important than it might be. Parties are still important however, and the issue 
ownership model is plausible for speeches if not so much for laws. There are some 
exceptions even here, and we have noted the manner in which Labour paid attention 
to the issue of crime as a means for establishing its credibility, especially during its 
reinvention as ‘New Labour’ in the 1990s.  
The main finding of this chapter is that talking is not the same as doing: party 
effects differ in executive speeches of policy priorities compared with legislative 
outputs. Political parties differ in their attention to a number of traditional issue 
strengths in statements of executive priorities, but do not exhibit such a discernible 
pattern of issue emphasis with respect to law making. This is not entirely surprising 
because speeches are designed for public consumption, and are intended to portray 
the policy agenda of the governing party in a positive light. Laws are often passed 
because of regulatory requirements, such as in response to European Union 
directives. Nevertheless, this finding is unexpected because of the close relationship 
between speeches and laws (Bevan et al. 2011).  Whereas the level of attention to 
policy issues in speeches tends to translate into laws, the partisan aspect of this 
agenda does not. That is a strong finding. Not only is there a general lack of 
correspondence between what is important for parties in speeches and what is 
important in laws, there are sign reversals for the effects of party for crime and 
banking and domestic commerce. For reasons that are not entirely clear, in office, 
Labour likes to talk more about crime and legislate less on it, while the Conservative 
Party does the opposite. This finding suggests parties use these venues for different 
purposes when in government.  
Parties matter, but not for all issues; nor do they impact in the same way across 
institutional arenas. For a party-dominated system, like the UK, there are pressures 
for the two main parties to maintain their attention to many policy issues, while 
establishing or maintaining ownership of some issues to distinguish them from their 
opponents. The results do not deliver a convincing victory for the politics matters 
debate, but at the same time we do not find that party effects disappear. Whether 
such a pattern extends outside the UK case is a matter for further research and 
debate. If parties matter less because of the compromises of coalition politics, then we 
might expect less party differences in other contexts. Research on executive speeches 
for Denmark and the Netherlands finds no effect of party control of government on 
the policy agenda of the speeches, and only a marginal impact for the UK (Mortensen 
et al. 2010). If coalition politics becomes a regular fixture in the UK, maybe the 
already modest party effects that we observe here will decline. 
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